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Article Dans Une Revue Information Economics and Policy Année : 2011

Patent pool formation: Timing matters

Yann Ménière
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This paper addresses the problem of non-cooperative patent pool formation by owners of patents related to a standard. We develop a model in which competing manufacturers must license several patents to produce standard-compliant goods. Separate licensing creates a double-marginalization problem. Moreover manufacturers must sink a fixed cost to enter the product market, and thus face a hold-up problem if licensing takes place after their entry. In this setting, the formation of a pool fails when it takes place after entry. Instead, we show that allowing patent owners to commit ex ante on joining a pool is an effective way to trigger the emergence of a stable pool solving both the double-marginalization and hold-up problems. Therefore, patent owners should be encouraged to coordinate their licensing policies on a voluntary basis at early stages in the standard-setting process.

Dates et versions

hal-00659058 , version 1 (12-01-2012)



François Lévêque, Yann Ménière. Patent pool formation: Timing matters. Information Economics and Policy, 2011, 23 (3-4), pp.243-251. ⟨10.1016/j.infoecopol.2011.07.002⟩. ⟨hal-00659058⟩
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